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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2003, the United States Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision,
struck down a controversial homosexual sodomy statute in Lawrence
v. Texas.2 The issue before the Court was whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permitted a state to criminalize
private and consensual sexual activity between adults.3 The Court
held that it did not. 4
Since the decision, much of the public discourse has turned to the
subject of marriage and whether or not existing state laws that ex-
clude same-sex marriages from public recognition will be able to stand
in light of Lawrence. People on both sides of the issue assert that
Lawrence paves the way for future challenges to existing state mar-
riage laws that define marriage as being between a man and a wo-
man.5 Justice Scalia, in dissent, warned that "[s]tate laws against...
same-sex marriage ... [are] called into question by [the Court's] deci-
sion,"6 and are left on "pretty shaky grounds" by reasoning in the con-
currence. 7 Many proponents of same-sex marriage hail Lawrence as a
victory,8 while many proponents of the traditional-marriage concept
bemoan its holding.9 Still others think that Lawrence's impact upon
the marriage issue will be minimal.1o Nebraskans might wonder if
the constitutional provision found in Section 29 of Article I in Ne-
2. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
3. Id. at 2476.
4. Id. at 2484.
5. See, e.g., David G. Savage, In Rulings, Echoes of 1992: The High Court Stuns
Conservatives-Just As It Did More Than a Decade Ago, 89 A.B.A. J. 21 (Aug.
2003) ("Both champions of family values and advocates of gay rights say the logic
of Lawrence paves the way for legalizing marriages between gay couples.").
6. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 2496.
8. For example, Ruth Harlow, legal director at Lambda Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund and a lead attorney in Lawrence, said that the decision gives gays and
lesbians stronger footing to attack state legislation banning same-sex marriage.
See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Court Strikes Down Laws Against Homo-
sexual Sex; 6-3 Ruling Affects Bans in 13 States, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2003, at 1.
9. For example, Jay Sekulow, chief counsel of the American Center for Law and
Justice said, "By providing constitutional protection to same-sex sodomy, the Su-
preme Court strikes a damaging blow for the traditional family that will only
intensify the legal battle to protect marriage and the traditional family." Id.
10. For example, Jerry Kilgore, Virginia Attorney General, said that the ruling in
Lawrence did not prevent states "from recognizing that marriage is fundamen-
tally between a man and a woman." Dean E. Murphy, THE SUPREME COURT:
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braska's State Constitution,1 which restricts marriage to opposite-
sex relationships, is teetering on "shaky ground" or resting firm. A
broad reading of Lawrence may suggest that Nebraska's provision and
similar Defense of Marriage Acts ("DOMAs")12 in other states are on
shaky ground, while a narrow reading suggests that DOMAs are se-
cure for now.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Lawrence and to discuss what impact, if any, the Court's
holding and reasoning might have on future constitutional challenges
to Nebraska's marriage provision. First, Part II of this Note will re-
view the background of Lawrence, describing the facts of the case and
its procedural posture. The background section will also include a re-
view of the holding in Bowers v. Hardwick,13 which the Lawrence
Court overruled. The background section will conclude with an over-
view of Nebraska's marriage provision in Section 29 of the Nebraska
Constitution. In Part III, this Note will examine some of the language
in the majority and concurring opinions of Lawrence and how it might
be employed in efforts to overturn Nebraska's DOMA. Next, the ma-
jority's use of foreign law will be discussed. Then, the due process
analysis in Lawrence will be evaluated. Finally, in Part IV, this Note
will argue that Lawrence's impact upon Nebraska's marriage provi-
sion and similar enactments in other states should be minimal, be-
cause the issues of sodomy and marriage are two different issues,
state laws that restrict the definition of marriage to one man and wo-
man are rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and the Court
in Lawrence explicitly limited its holding to sodomy laws.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Procedural Posture of Lawrence
In response to a reported weapons disturbance, police officers were
dispatched to a private residence in Houston, Texas. Upon entering
the residence of John Lawrence, the officers observed Lawrence and
another man, Tyron Garner, engaged in anal sex. The two men (peti-
tioners in Lawrence) were arrested and held in custody overnight.
They were later convicted of deviate sexual conduct under a Texas
statute forbidding certain sexual acts between persons of the same sex
THE REACTION, Gays Celebrate, and Plan Campaign on Broader Rights, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 27, 2003, at A20.
11. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29. In this Note, this provision will be referred to as "Ne-
braska's marriage provision," "Nebraska's DOMA," or "Section 29."
12. For a description of Nebraska's DOMA and those in other states, in addition to
the federal DOMA, see infra section II.D.
13. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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and each was fined $200.14 At trial, Lawrence and Garner pleaded no
contest to the charge, but challenged the statute as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and a similar provision in the Texas Constitution. Their
challenge was rejected by the county criminal court.15
Next, Lawrence and Garner appealed to the Court of Appeals of
Texas for the Fourteenth District.16 They contended that the state
homosexual sodomy statute was a violation of both federal and state
equal protection guarantees, because it discriminated on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender. 17 Their argument was rejected, how-
ever, because the court found that there is "no fundamental right to
engage in sodomy," homosexuals are not a "suspect class," and the pro-
hibition against homosexual conduct advanced was rationally related
to the legitimate state interest of preserving public morals. 18 Further,
Lawrence and Garner argued that the statute violated their right to
privacy. 19 The court rejected this contention, because it could find no
constitutional "zone of privacy."20 Finally, the Texas appellate court
dismissed the appellants' argument that Texas should join the states
that had already legalized homosexual conduct by expressing concern
that such a decision would usurp the role of the state Legislature to
make or change the law.2 1
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider three ques-
tions: (1) whether the Texas sodomy statute violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it criminalized
sexual conduct between same-sex couples, but not different-sex
couples; (2) whether the petitioners' interests in liberty and privacy
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had
been violated; and (3) whether Bowers should be overruled. 22
Ultimately, the Court overruled Bowers and held that the Texas
statute violated the Due Process Clause, because it advanced "no legit-
imate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual."23 Justice Kennedy delivered the
opinion of the Court, which was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Souter, and Stevens. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, but
14. The description of facts herein was derived from Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475-76,
and Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) [Lawrence
(State)].
15. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
16. Id.
17. Lawrence (State), 41 S.W.3d at 350.
18. Id. at 357.
19. Id. at 359.
20. Id. at 362.
21. See id.
22. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476 (2003).
23. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
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would have struck down the Texas statute on equal protection
grounds and would not have overruled Bowers. Justice Scalia filed a
dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissenting
opinion.
B. Dealing with Bowers v. Hardwick
In 1986, the Supreme Court upheld a state's criminal sodomy law
in Bowers v. Hardwick.24 The Bowers facts are similar to those in
Lawrence. In Bowers, a man was charged with violating a Georgia
statute that criminalized sodomy by committing sexual acts with an-
other man.25 Although the charge was dropped, a lawsuit was
brought to challenge the constitutionality of the sodomy statute.26
The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether there was a funda-
mental right under the Constitution to engage in homosexual sexual
conduct.27 The Court held that no such fundamental right existed,
because the right to engage in homosexual activity was not "'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'"2s Rather, the Court
said that proscriptions against homosexual sodomy had ancient
roots.29 Thus, the Court upheld the validity of state sodomy laws in
Bowers.
In Lawrence, the Court was faced with the controlling precedent of
Bowers.3 0 The dissenters would have followed the holding in Bow-
ers.3 1 Justice O'Connor, concurring, wanted to distinguish Bowers
from Lawrence.3 2 Instead, the majority overruled it. According to the
majority, several pertinent cases decided before Bowers had expanded
24. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 188.
27. Id. at 190.
28. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion)).
29. Id.
30. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476 (2003).
31. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at- 2488-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia believed
that Bowers had been rightly decided, id. at 2492, and took issue with the major-
ity's "surprising readiness to reconsider a decision rendered a mere 17 years ago."
Id. at 2488. In Scalia's opinion, the majority had "revise[d] the standards of stare
decisis." Id. at 2491.
32. Id. at 2484-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor had voted with the
majority in Bowers and did not join with the majority to overturn it in Lawrence.
Id. at 2484. O'Connor would have struck down the Texas sodomy law under the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. She distinguished Lawrence from Bowers because
the statute in Lawrence "ban[ned] homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual," a
discrimination against a group of persons not allowed by the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 2486.
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the "substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause."
33
Many states had also abolished their criminal sodomy laws since Bow-
ers was decided.34
The Court said that decisions in Planned Parenthood v. Casey
3 5
and Romer v. Evans,36 both decided after Bowers, had caused "serious
erosion" to the foundations of Bowers.3 7 In Casey, the Court reaf-
firmed the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy under the
substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause. 38 Casey was cited by
the majority primarily for its dicta about personal autonomy in per-
sonal decisions. 39 The majority believed that Bowers was in conflict
with Casey's liberty principle, because it denied homosexuals the right
to such autonomy.4 0 The dissent, however, argued that Casey's hold-
ing did not cast doubt upon the holding in Bowers, because the abor-
tion right in Casey, decided after Bowers, was less expansive than the
right in Roe, decided before Bowers.4 1 As for Casey's "sweet-mystery-
of-life" dictum, the Lawrence dissent believed it cast doubt upon "noth-
ing at all."4 2
In Romer, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution had been violated by an amendment to
Colorado's Constitution ("Amendment 2") adopted in a 1992 statewide
referendum.4 3 The amendment prohibited any legislative, executive,
or judicial action at any level of state or local government that was
designed to protect homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexuals from discrimi-
nation.4 4 Colorado's amendment failed the Court's rational basis in-
quiry because its impact upon homosexual persons was too broad, and
33. Id. at 2476. The pertinent pre-Bowers cases the Court discussed were: Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding right of privacy in penumbras of con-
stitutional provisions and invalidating state law forbidding the use of contracep-
tives because it intruded on the right of marital privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating state law that prohibited distribution of contracep-
tives to unmarried persons); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a
woman has a right to abort her unborn child); and Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down state law that forbade the sale
or distribution of contraceptive devices to children under the age of sixteen). See
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476-77.
34. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
35. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
37. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
38. 505 U.S. at 846-47.
39. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
40. See id. at 2481-82.
41. Id. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
44. ld. at 629.
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further, the amendment's excessive breadth demonstrated that the ac-
tion arose out of animus toward the burdened class.45
According to the majority in Lawrence, Romer "weakened" the pre-
cedent in Bowers,46 a point the dissent did not "quarrel" with.47 Alter-
natively, in the concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor relied
extensively on Romer's equal protection analysis to say that the Equal
Protection Clause would not permit Texas to "single [] out homosexu-
als 'for disfavored legal status."'48 Although the majority found the
alternative equal protection argument "tenable," it concluded that it
must deal with the due process holding in Bowers directly. By doing
so, the Lawrence Court asserted that even if the Texas statute had
prohibited both same-sex and different-sex participants from engaging
in the specified sexual conduct (thus apparently satisfying equal pro-
tection), it would have nevertheless been invalid on substantive due
process grounds.49 Thus, Bowers was overruled.50
C. Recent State Trends Concerning Sodomy Laws
The Court in Lawrence noted that there had been a recent trend of
states abolishing their prohibitions on sodomy.51 Although all fifty
states had outlawed sodomy before 1961, only twenty-four states and
the District of Columbia still maintained sodomy laws in 1986 when
the Court upheld their validity in Bowers.52 By 2003, that number
had dwindled further to thirteen states, with four of those states di-
recting their sodomy laws only against homosexual conduct.53
This trend of state legislative action reflected different things to
different justices in Lawrence. For the majority, the reduction of state
sodomy laws demonstrated "an emerging awareness" that adults
should be given liberty to decide how to conduct their private sexual
lives.54 For Justice Scalia, a recent trend or an "emerging awareness"
by definition only proved that homosexual conduct was "not 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition[s],' as . . . 'fundamental
45. Id. at 632.
46. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
47. Id. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Here, in an interesting aside, Justice Scalia
used his agreement that Romer had indeed "eroded" the holding in Bowers to
assert that Roe and Casey (abortion cases) had been "equally 'eroded' by Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg," id. (citations omitted), presumably to posture a future argu-
ment on the abortion issue.
48. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S.
at 633).
49. Id. at 2482.
50. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
51. Id. at 2480.
52. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2480.
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right' status requires."5 5 Implicit in Justice Thomas's dissent is the
idea that recent legislative action showed that legislatures were doing
what they were supposed to be doing-enacting and/or repealing
laws-a job that the Court is "not empowered" to do.56
Furthermore, the justices debated whether or not there had been
significant enforcement of sodomy laws and what such enforcement or
nonenforcement meant to their discussion. The majority stressed that
prosecution against "consenting adults acting in private" under such
laws had been infrequent. Because of this fact, the majority main-
tained that the criminalization of homosexual sex did not have "an-
cient roots."57 The dissenters, on the other hand, pointed out that
private behavior would by its nature yield low enforcement numbers;
yet they still provided evidence showing that prosecutions for consen-
sual homosexual sodomy, though infrequent, were not uncommon.
58
These prosecutions, the dissenting opinion maintained, demonstrate
that sexual conduct among homosexuals is "not a fundamental right
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' 59 The concur-
ring opinion stressed that, although rare, the prosecution in Lawrence
was evidence that prosecutions under the Texas statute did occur,
thus proving that homosexuals were made "unequal in the eyes of the
law."6 o
D. Nebraska's Marriage Provision
On November 7, 2000, Nebraska voters approved an amendment to
the state constitution that provided:
Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in
Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domes-
tic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or
recognized in Nebraska.
6 1
The Nebraska marriage amendment (then called "Initiative Measure
416") was approved by seventy percent of the voters. 62 Nebraska is
one of at least thirty-eight states that has adopted legislation or con-
stitutional provisions reserving marriage to opposite-sex couples.
6 3
55. Id. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 2478-81.
58. See id. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.
62. See Stephen Buttry & Leslie Reed, Challenge is Ahead for 416, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Nov. 8, 2000, at 1A.
63. See ALAsKA CONST. art. I, §25; HAw. CONST. art. I, § 23; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29;
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (1998); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
101 (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie 2002); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 308.5 (West Supp. 2004); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104 (Lexis 2003); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 1997); GA. CODE
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These enactments are often referred to as "Defense of Marriage Acts"
("DOMAs"). In 1996, President Clinton signed a federal DOMA
passed by Congress. The federal DOMA defines marriage, for federal
purposes, as a male-female union and gives each state the authority
to refuse to give effect to an act of another state that treats a same-sex
relationship as a marriage.6 4
The push for state DOMAs came about, in large part, as a response
to court decisions in Alaska and Hawaii, where the exclusion of same-
sex couples from state marriage schemes had been declared unconsti-
tutional under the respective state constitutions. 6 5 Although both
those decisions were subsequently overruled by state constitutional
amendments, 6 6 many feared that in time another court would attempt
to redefine marriage. This fear proved to be prophetic when the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court held that "limiting the protections, benefits
and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples" violated the
Massachusetts Constitution.67 Additionally, the Vermont Supreme
ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1999); HAw. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 32-209
(Michie 1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/212 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-11-1-1 (2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-
101 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 89 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 701 (West 1998); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 551.1, 551.271 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01
(West 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West
2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2003); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-03-01 (1997); 2004 Ohio Laws 61 (to be codified at OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 3, 3.1 (West 2001); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law. Co-op.
1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113
(2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (Vernon 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2
(1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.04.010 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (Michie 2001). Also, just
before this Note went to press, voters in Missouri approved a state constitutional
amendment defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman. See Foes
of Gay Marriages Savor Win, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Aug. 5, 2004, at 1A [herein-
after Foes].
64. The Federal DOMA is embodied in 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (providing for federal pur-
poses, "'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife,... 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife") and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (providing that a state is "not
required to give effect" to any act or proceeding from another state that treats a
same-sex relationship as a marriage).
65. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 75, 82 (Haw.
1993); on remand Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-3194, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), affd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
66. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 ("marriage may exist only between one man and
one woman"); HAw. CONST. art. 1, § 23 ("[the] legislature shall have the power to
reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples"). In Hawaii, the state legislature later
enacted legislation providing that a marriage contract can exist "only between a
man and a woman." HAw. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1993).
67. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003).
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Court found it unconstitutional to exclude same-sex couples from the
benefits and protections that flowed from marriage, but gave the state
legislature the opportunity to create marriage equivalents called "civil
unions."68 A civil union gives homosexual couples all the same rights,
benefits, and protections that married couples enjoy.6 9
Though Nebraska law has always presumed that marriage was a
male-female union,7 0 it did not explicitly define it as such 7 1 before the
year 2000. Consequently, it was conceivable that a homosexual couple
would obtain a same-sex marriage or another union equivalent to
marriage in another state and then try to get a Nebraska court to de-
clare it valid in Nebraska.72 Thus, Nebraskans amended their state
constitution, thereby reaffirming the traditional definition of marriage
and ensuring that the state would not be forced to recognize same-sex
marriages or purported marriage equivalents.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Language in Lawrence that Could Be Used in a Challenge
to Nebraska's DOMA
Although the Lawrence Court explicitly pressed for a limited read-
ing of its holding, 73 there is language in both the majority and concur-
ring opinions that conceivably could be cited as persuasive authority
in a challenge to Nebraska's DOMA or similar acts in other states.
For instance, although the Court confined its holding to private con-
duct, a person with a broad reading of the majority opinion in Law-
rence could argue that marriage falls into a "realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter"74-meaning either that the gov-
68. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
69. As of July 1, 2000, "[p]arties to a civil union are given all the same benefits, pro-
tections and responsibilities under Vermont law, whether they derive from stat-
ute, administrative or court rule policy, common law or any other source of civil
law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage." OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
STATE, STATE OF VERMONT VERMONT GUIDE TO CIVIL UNIONS, at http://www.sec.
state.vt.us/otherprg/civilunions/civilunions.html#faql (last visited July 10, 2004).
70. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (Reissue 1998) (requiring male to be seventeen
years old and female to be seventeen years old); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-206 (Reis-
sue 1998) ("husband not liable for debts contracted by wife before marriage").
71. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-101 (Reissue 1998) ("In law, marriage is considered a
civil contract, to which the consent of the parties capable of contracting is
essential.").
72. For example, current data shows that less than a third of civil union registrants
are Vermont citizens, which means that many couples travel to Vermont to ob-
tain a civil union and then return to their home state. See Katherine Shaw
Spaht, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Future of Marriage in the Law,
49 Loy. L. REV. 1, 23 (2003).
73. See infra section IV.D.
74. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847
(1992)).
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ernment cannot limit one's choices about whom to marry or that the
government should not recognize marriages at all. 75 Borrowing lan-
guage from Casey, the Lawrence Court asserted that "our laws and
tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education" 76 and "the Constitution demands [respect] for
the autonomy of the person in making these choices."77 Such personal
choices, the Court stated, are "central to personal dignity and auton-
omy, . . . [and] central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."78 The Court opined that "[persons in a homosexual re-
lationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual
persons do," but would be denied this right under Bowers.7 9 The
Court then went on to overturn Bowers.8 0
Based on the Court's reasoning for overturning Bowers, it is at
least arguable that if a state does not allow complete decisional auton-
omy in the life-matters mentioned by the Court (i.e., marriage, procre-
ation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education) it is acting unconstitutionally. Similar-sounding reasoning
was used recently by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (in
the context of a state constitutional decision). In Goodridge v. Depart-
ment of Public Health,8 1 it was held that restricting marriage to oppo-
site-sex couples violated the Massachusetts constitution. There, the
passage of Lawrence discussed immediately supra was cited as an ex-
ample of the proposition that "[w]hether and whom to marry, how to
express sexual intimacy, and whether and how to establish a family
... are among the most basic of every individual's liberty and due
process rights."82 These liberties would be hollow, according to the
75. Some people propose that government should not sanction any marriages; that is,
marriage should be privatized. See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, Abolish Marriage: Let's
Really Get the Government Out of Our Bedrooms, WASH. POST, July 3, 2003, at
A23.
76. 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). In this section of the opinion, the Court
revived the following dictum from Casey:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a per-
son may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and au-
tonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847). Justice Scalia referred to this as the "famed
sweet-mystery-of-life passage." Id. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
80. Id. at 2484.
81. 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003).
82. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959 (citing Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481).
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court, if the state could foreclose a person from choosing a same-sex
spouse.8 3 Thus, at least one court has applied Lawrence dicta to its
reasoning for redefining marriage.8 4
However, in applying Casey's "laundry list" of personal decisions to
its reasoning for overruling Bowers, the Lawrence Court stretched the
meaning of Bowers too far. Bowers cannot be fairly read as a denial of
autonomy to homosexuals in the listed categories of personal deci-
sions. Casey, an abortion case, may have involved some of these deci-
sions, but Bowers did not. The narrow issue in Bowers was "whether
the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexu-
als to engage in sodomy,"85 not whether gay or lesbian persons were
denied autonomy in making decisions about marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, or education. Al-
though the Court framed the issue in Lawrence8 6 differently than the
issue in Bowers, the factual scenario before the Court was essentially
the same. Accordingly, it is also a stretch to say that Lawrence now
stands for the proposition that government cannot restrict a personal
decision like whom to marry.
Certain aspects of each of the Casey-Lawrence "personal decisions"
are governmentally regulated. "That many of the rights and liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does
not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, inti-
mate, and personal decisions are so protected."8 7 Complete decisional
autonomy is a fiction in a civilized society because the personal auton-
omy of everyone-heterosexuals and homosexuals-is intruded upon
in some way by governmental oversight in these areas. For instance,
in Nebraska, a twenty-five-year-old cannot marry a sixteen-year-
old.88 A woman cannot get an abortion after her unborn child reaches
viability.8 9 Certain contraceptives are not available without a written
prescription. 9 0 Laws also restrict a person's decisionmaking freedom
in the areas of family relationships and childrearing, such as needed
83. See id.
84. But see Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (ex-
pressing that the Court in Lawrence "did not intend by its comments to address
same-sex marriages.").
85. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
86. The Court framed the issue as "whether the petitioners were free as adults to
engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution." Lawrence, 123 S.
Ct. at 2476.
87. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997).
88. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (Reissue 1998).
89. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-329 (Reissue 1995) (prohibiting abortion after child
reaches viability).
90. See NEB. ADMIN. CODE tit. 172, ch. 134, §§ 009.16, 009.16A (1996).
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laws against child abuse. 9 1 And to the chagrin of elementary students
throughout Nebraska, a child does not have the autonomy to decide
against schooling, nor does the parent have the liberty to decide that
for the child.92
Complete "autonomy of the person in making these choices" 9 3 is
more a theoretical fiction than reality in a civilized society. Tragic re-
sults would follow if a concept of complete autonomy was taken to its
logical conclusion. A peaceful society could not long survive if every-
one truly had "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life," 9 4 free of
any objective boundaries. Civilization demands that we adhere to
some objective standards and to some "compulsion of the State."9 5
Moreover, contrary to the view of the Lawrence majority, even het-
erosexual people do not have "autonomy for these purposes" 96 when it
comes to marriage. American law has a long-standing history of re-
stricting the choices of a person when it comes to whom he or she can
marry.97 In Nebraska, no person has the liberty to marry whomever
he might choose. For example, a person is not free to marry her
91. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-707 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2002). In fact, Article
7 of Chapter 28 in the Nebraska Revised Statutes is entitled 'Offenses Involving
the Family Relation" (emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-201 (Reissue 2003) (requiring compulsory educa-
tion for children between seven and sixteen years of age).
93. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003).
94. Id. at 2481 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847). The 1999 Columbine school shooting
tragedy is an ominous example of this type of relativistic and "no absolute stan-
dards" philosophy taken to its literal extreme. An author of a book about that
tragic day commented:
[The Columbine killers] proclaimed it was payback time when they en-
tered the Columbine library. Feeling victimized and exacting revenge
arises from the sense of being empowered to act upon one's own version
of truth as the master of one's destiny. It gets messy, however, when one
person, in mastering his personal destiny, cuts short the destiny of some-
one else.
[C.S.] Lewis argues that when young people are reared in an environ-
ment that jettisons "objective value" (what he calls 'the belief that cer-
tain attitudes are really true and others really false") the result is a
system that creates young people bereft of magnanimity and driven by
visceral cravings-his men without chests .... Lewis concludes: "The
practical result of [such an] education ... must be the destruction of the
society which accepts it."
WENDY MURRAY ZOBA, DAY OF RECKONING: COLUMBINE AND THE SEARCH FOR
AMERICA'S SOUL 76-77 (2000) (quoting C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 12, 17
(1947)).
95. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
96. Id. at 2482.
97. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of anti-polygamy laws).
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brother or a first cousin.98 Someone already married cannot legally
take a second spouse. 99 One cannot choose to marry any other person
absent a marriage license and an official solemnization proceeding.100
Thus, every person's marital choice is limited by the state's public pol-
icy and statutory scheme.
Although Lawrence was decided upon Due Process grounds, Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurring opinion could impact an Equal Protection
challenge to Nebraska's marriage provision. 10 1 O'Connor would have
struck down the Texas sodomy statute under the Equal Protection
Clause. 102 She looked to equal protection cases such as Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno'03 and Romer v. Evans104 and declared that the
Court had "never held that moral disapproval, without any other as-
serted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of
persons." 105 A challenge to Nebraska's DOMA brought under the the-
ory that it unconstitutionally discriminates against a group of persons
(i.e., homosexuals) could attempt to use O'Connor's concurrence for
persuasive support.10 6 Nebraska's DOMA does withhold state recog-
nition from same-sex relationships. However, the provision is not a
mere expression of moral disapproval of homosexual relationships;1o 7
98. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-103 (Reissue 1998).
99. Id.
100. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-104 (Reissue 1998); Ropken v. Ropken, 169 Neb. 352,
354, 99 N.W.2d 480, 483 (1959) ("Common-law marriages are not recognized in
Nebraska .... Cohabitation in Nebraska without a ceremonial marriage is
meretricious.").
101. One of the alternative questions posed to the Court was whether the criminal
convictions under the Texas sodomy law were a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476. The majority's decision was based on due
process grounds in order to overturn Bowers, but the Lawrence majority called
the Equal Protection challenge "a tenable argument." Id. at 2482.
102. Id. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103. 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (holding that the unrelated person provision of the Food
Stamp Act created an irrational classification in violation of the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
104. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a Colorado state constitutional amendment,
effectively repealing state and local provisions barring discrimination on the ba-
sis of sexual orientation, violated the Equal Protection Clause).
105. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 973 (Mass. 2003)
(Greaney, J., concurring) (citing O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence to
support notion that same sex couples are "deemed less worthy of social and legal
recognition" by the state's opposite-sex marital laws).
107. In 2000, during the days leading up to the amendment vote in Nebraska, one
opponent of Section 29 (then called "Initiative 416") said that "lilt is intended
only to attack the family relationships between lesbian and gay Nebraskans."
Charlie Kauffman, Lawyer Blasts Defense of Marriage Amendment, DAILY NE-
BRASKAN, Oct. 2, 2002 (quoting attorney Evan Wolfson), available at http://www.
dailynebraskan.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2000/10/02/39d7fbb78?in-archive= 1.
But see DAVE BYDALEK, FAMILY FIRST, Initiative 416-It's All About Marriage, in
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rather, it is designed to "preserv[e] the traditional institution of mar-
riage," which O'Connor affirmed is a legitimate state interest. 0 8
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor called for a "more searching form
of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause" if they "exhibit[] such a desire to harm a politically
unpopular group."1o 9 Although Nebraska's DOMA was not enacted
out of a desire to harm homosexuals, and laws like DOMA that
neither target a suspect class nor infringe upon a fundamental right
are given rational basis review, it is conceivable that litigants chal-
lenging the amendment would urge the application of O'Connor's
"more searching form" of review. What such a review looks like, how-
ever, is not known. Justice Scalia criticized O'Connor for failing to
explain what she meant by a "more searching" form of rational basis
review and asserted that the cases O'Connor cited applied only the
conventional rational basis analysis, not a "more searching" one. 110
Scalia surmised that a review such as O'Connor's "must at least mean,
however, that laws exhibiting 'a ... desire to harm a politically unpop-
ular group' are invalid even though there may be a conceivable ra-
tional basis to support them."' 1 ' Scalia's concern was that such
reasoning would leave state DOMA laws on "pretty shaky
grounds."112 But as will be discussed infra, there is a big difference
between criminal laws targeting homosexuals and marriage laws that
confer state endorsement upon an ideal type of relationship for pur-
poses of civil marriage. 113
Regarding the Texas sodomy statute, O'Connor wrote that "[wihile
it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by
this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual.
Under such circumstances, Texas's sodomy law is targeted at more
than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a class."114
Similar reasoning could be used to argue that even though Nebraska's
DOMA withholds state endorsement from certain conduct (i.e., the
uniting of persons in a same-sex relationship), it is "directed toward
gay persons as a class" since such conduct is "closely correlated with
CAPITOL WATCH: A POLICY REPORT BY FAMILY FIRST (Oct. 2000) (stating that the
purpose of the initiative "is not about bigotry and discrimination; it is about mar-
riage. It simply recognizes the foundational role of marriage between one man
and one woman in our society and the corresponding benefits and responsibilities
exclusively afforded that relationship as a matter of state public policy."), at
http://www.familyfirst.org/capitolwatch/1000.pdf.
108. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 2485.
110. Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See infra section IV.A.
114. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486-87.
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being homosexual."115 But the marriage provision is not directed to-
ward gay persons. Instead, it relates to the advancement of certain
state interests, some of which will be discussed in this Note.116
In short, language contained in the dicta of Lawrence could con-
ceivably be used by litigants to support a challenge to Nebraska's
DOMA. Although the holding of any given case determines its prece-
dential value, looking at the way the Court has arrived at its decision
can be helpful in gauging how the Court might rule on other issues.
B. The Majority's Discussion of Foreign Law
In Lawrence, the majority opinion cited foreign law to counter an
assertion in Bowers by Chief Justice Burger that, essentially, homo-
sexual conduct had been criminalized "throughout the history of West-
ern civilization."117 The Lawrence Court called Burger's references to
the history of Western civilization "sweeping" and commented that
other authorities had "point[ed] in an opposite direction."118 First, the
Lawrence court noted that the British Parliament had repealed its
laws punishing homosexual conduct in 1967.119 Next, several cases
were cited out of the European Court of Human Rights, where laws
forbidding homosexual conduct were invalidated under the European
Convention on Human Rights.120 To the Lawrence Court, these cases
demonstrated that the holding of Bowers had been rejected in other
nations where action was taken "consistent with an affirmation of the
protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate consensual
conduct."12 1 The dissent responded by saying that the majority's dis-
cussion of foreign views was "[d]angerous dicta.., since 'this Court...
should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."'1 22
The danger in the Court's discussion of foreign law could be that
lower courts will interpret Lawrence as giving them reason to consult
foreign law. At least one district judge, reading into Lawrence that
the Court "relied" on foreign experience and jurisprudence, cited Law-
rence as persuasive support for considering "the experience of other
nations which share our traditions in determining contemporary stan-
dards of decency."123 That judge is reading the foreign law discussion
115. Id.
116. See infra section I.C.
117. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
118. Id. at 2481.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2481, 2483.
121. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
122. Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 n.
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
123. United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 65-66 (D. Mass. 2003) (upholding
the Federal Death Penalty Act).
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in Lawrence too broadly, however. American courts should not inter-
pret Lawrence as giving them license to use foreign jurisprudence to
inform their decisions. Each time the majority discussed foreign law,
it carefully qualified the discussion as a response to the "Western civi-
lization" language of Bowers.12 4
Is it common for the Supreme Court to consider foreign jurispru-
dence? Does the use of foreign law in Lawrence give the reader any
insight as to whether or not state DOMA laws are on "shaky ground"?
Although a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
Note, these questions will be addressed briefly.
Throughout its history, the U.S. Supreme Court has been hesitant
to give much credence to foreign legal experience.12 5 Early on, Chief
Justice Marshall12 6 announced:
The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the nation
as an independent sovereign power. The jurisdiction of the nation, within its
own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limi-
tation, not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty, to the extent of
the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty, to the same extent, in
that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to
the full and complete power of a nation, within its own territories, must be
traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other
legitimate source.
1 2 7
When the Supreme Court has appealed to foreign and interna-
tional sources, it has usually been in cases with direct international
implications. Such, for example, was the situation in The Paquete Ha-
bana.128 There, two Cuban fishing vessels sailing under the flag of
Spain were captured as "prize[s] of war" and sold at an auction during
124. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (discussing British Parliament and European
Court of Human Rights in response to the "sweeping references by Chief Justice
Burger to the history of Western civilization"); id. at 2483 (discussing the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights after noting "[tlo the extent Bowers relied on values
we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and hold-
ing in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere.").
125. See Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J.
INT'L L. 409, 410, 417-21 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and
Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation of "Proportional-
ity," Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 589 ("IT]he U.S. Supreme
Court is resistant to considering foreign constitutional law."); Cody Moon, Note,
Comparative Constitutional Analysis: Should the United States Supreme Court
Join the Dialogue?, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 229, 239 (2003) (arguing that the
Supreme Court "has been reluctant to fully embrace" comparative constitutional
analysis).
126. Chief Justice John Marshall served as the fourth Chief Justice of the U.S. Su-
preme Court from 1801 to 1835. See ADRIENNE SIEGEL, 2 THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN LIFE: THE MARSHALL COURT 1801-1835 250 (1987).
127. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
128. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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the Spanish-American War. 129 The Court held that fishing vessels
sailing under the flag of a nation at war with the United States could
not be lawfully captured by armed U.S. ships. 13 0 In the opinion, the
Court noted that "ancient usage among civilized nations" recognized
the exemption of fishing boats, along with their cargoes and crew,
from being captured as war prizes.131 A lengthy history of this inter-
national principle was then given, including descriptions of orders
from foreign kings, treaties between other nations, writings from for-
eign jurists, and foreign court decisions.132 Given the situation, the
discussion of the "law of nations" in The Paquete Habana was consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's traditional usage of foreign jurispru-
dence "in resolving a special class of disputes at the intersection of
commerce, warfare and diplomacy."133 Accordingly, when the United
States Supreme Court has looked to foreign sources as persuasive au-
thority, it has normally been in cases that involved true international
issues, such as navigable seas, war, national borders, or international
commerce.134
On the other hand, the use of foreign sources to inform an interpre-
tation of the Constitution for a domestic issue has usually encountered
chastisement from one or more of the justices of the Supreme Court.
For instance, Justice Holmes scolded fellow jurists for citing English
authority for a hearsay rule, reminding them that: "the English cases
since the separation of the two countries do not bind us."1 3 5 In Stan-
ford v. Kentucky, 136 the Court refused to use the death penalty prac-
129. Id. at 679.
130. Id. at 714.
131. Id. at 686.
132. Id. at 686-709.
133. Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1119, 1120 (1996).
134. See, e.g., Wildenhus's Case, Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail, 120 U.S. 1, 12,
18-19 (1887) (noting that courts in England and France had reached similar con-
clusions in deciding that a U.S. court had jurisdiction over a homicide that took
place aboard a foreign merchant ship while harbored in a U.S. port); Mitsubishi
Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985) (citing arbitration
rules promulgated by Japan and the United Nations in an action involving inter-
national companies brought to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration
Act and an international arbitration convention); id. at 660-61 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (discussing court decisions out of Belgium and Italy as well as public
policy in Germany to illustrate that other signers to the convention had refused
to enforce agreements); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 678
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to international charters to show a "con-
sensus of international opinion that condemns one Nation's violation of the terri-
torial integrity of a friendly neighbor" in a case where a citizen and resident of
Mexico was kidnapped and flown to Texas, where he was arrested for his partici-
pation in the kidnapping and murder of a DEA agent and the agent's pilot).
135. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 278 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
136. 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that imposing death penalty on defendants who
were sixteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the crime was not
unconstitutional).
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tice of other countries to interpret the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, and commented, "[Ilt is American con-
ceptions of decency that are dispositive."137 In Atkins v. Virginia,13s
Chief Justice Rehnquist complained of "the Court's decision to place
weight on foreign laws ... [since] [t]he Court's suggestion that these
sources are relevant to the constitutional question finds little support
in our precedents."13 9 Thus, the reliance on foreign jurisprudence in
Supreme Court opinions has not been without controversy where the
issue was of a domestic nature rather than an international one.1 40
The current justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have differing
views on whether to rely on foreign sources in their decisionmaking
processes. Justice Breyer14 1 and Justice Stevens142 have occasionally
appealed to foreign jurisprudence in their written opinions. Other jus-
tices have commented in out-of-Court settings that they may be in-
clined to look at foreign jurisprudence to assist them in their
decisions. For instance, Justice Ginsburg has said, "Our island or lone
ranger mentality is beginning to change .... [Justices] are becoming
more open to comparative and international law perspectives."14 3
Justice O'Connor predicts that she will probably look "more frequently
to the decisions of other constitutional courts."14 4 Although Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist chided the Atkins majority for giving weight to foreign
laws,14 5 elsewhere he has stated that "now that constitutional law is
137. Id. at 369 n.1.
138. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing mentally retarded criminals is viola-
tive of the Eighth Amendment).
139. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
140. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (responding to the
dissent's citation of European sources by saying that "such comparative analysis
[is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution" in a case holding the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act unconstitutional on federalism
principles).
141. Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Other nations'] experience may
nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a
common legal problem.").
142. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (referring to foreign laws); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (discussing relevance of death penalty laws in other
countries).
143. Gina Holland, Ginsburg: Int'l Law Shaped Court Rulings, KANSAS CiTY STAR at
http://www.kansascity. com/mld/kansascity/news/breaking-news/6445859.htm?
templat=co (Aug. 2, 2003). See also Hannelore Sudermann, U.S. Courts Reflect-
ing World, Ginsburg Says, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW.COM, at http://www.spokes-
manreview.com/pf.asp?date=091903&ID=s1412843&cat=section.idaho (Sept. 19,
2003) ("The U.S. court system can even learn from other nations on issues con-
cerning human rights, [Ginsburg] said.").
144. Jackson, supra note 125, at 638 (quoting Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our
Horizons: Why American Judges and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law,
1997 Spring Meeting, American College of Trial Lawyers, reprinted in 4 INT'L
JUD. OBSERVER, June 1997, at 2.).
145. 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United
States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional
courts to aid in their own deliberative process." 146 Justice Kennedy
cited foreign law in Lawrence, but for the limited purpose of respond-
ing to the "Western civilization" language of Bowers.1 47 Similarly,
Justice Souter has discussed foreign law, but also in a limited man-
ner.148 For their part, Justice Scalia 149 and Justice Thomas 150 have
expressed strong opposition to the use of foreign materials in Court
deliberations.
Does the fact that some of the Court's members appear at least
willing to look to foreign jurisprudence say anything about how the
Supreme Court might rule in a challenge to a state DOMA? Where
might the Court look for guidance about state marriage laws and what
would it find? As stated earlier, although in a measured response, the
Lawrence Court cited cases out of the European Court of Human
Rights.151 Based upon that, one could predict that a DOMA challenge
might lead some members of the Court to look toward European law if
they decide to consult foreign jurisprudential sources. Several coun-
tries in Northern and Western Europe have either already legalized or
are moving in the direction of legalizing same-sex marriages. 15 2 In
146. Jackson, supra note 125, at 585 (quoting William Rehnquist, Constitutional
Courts-Comparative Remarks (1989), reprinted in GERMANY AND ITS BASIc LAW:
PAST, PRESENT AND FuTuE--A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993)).
147. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481, 2483-84.
148. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 785-87 (1997) (Souter, J., concur-
ring). In Glucksberg, Justice Souter discussed physician-assisted suicide in the
Netherlands, but the discussion was in response to a policy plan proposed by the
Respondents, which the Netherlands had previously implemented. He went on to
question "whether an independent front-line investigation into the facts of a for-
eign country's legal administration can be soundly undertaken through American
courtroom litigation," id. at 787, deferring instead to state legislatures, which
"have superior opportunities to obtain the facts necessary for a judgment about
the present controversy." Id. at 788.
149. See supra notes 122, 133, 137 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. See also Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S.
990 (1990) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (disapproving peti-
tioner's reliance on "the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, [and] the Privy Council" when petitioner
could not find support for his position in "our own jurisprudence").
151. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. See generally MALCOLM N. SHAw,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 263-67 (4th ed. 1997) (providing an overview of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights). That court's authority extends to all cases involv-
ing the European Convention on Human Rights. Id. As of 1996, the court
consisted of forty judges, equal to the number of member states in the Council of
Europe. Id. at 263.
152. See Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriage and Family, Inching Down
the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the
United States and Europe, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2004, 2007-08 (2003) [hereinafter
Developments in the Law].
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2001, the Netherlands legalized same-sex marriages, defining mar-
riage as being between "two persons of different sex or of the same
sex."1 53 Belgium traveled down the same path in early 2003.154 Fur-
thermore, broad "Registered Partnerships"-conferring almost all the
same rights and responsibilities on same-sex couples as opposite-sex
married couples-have been enacted in Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Iceland, and Finland.155 Less expansive forms of same-sex unions ex-
ist in Hungary, France, Germany and Portugal.156
Similarly, jurisprudential activity in Canada makes it appear as if
Canada might be traveling the same path as the European countries
discussed above. In 2003, an Ontario court declared it unconstitu-
tional under Canada's Federal Constitution to deny same-sex couples
the right to marry, and a court in British Columbia approved the re-
gistration of same-sex couples in that province.157 Incidentally, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court compared its decision in Goodridge to
that of Ontario's and "concur[red]" with the Ontario court's decision to
"refine [] the common-law meaning of marriage."158 Clearly, a court
looking outside the United States for persuasive authority to grant
governmental sanction of same-sex marriages will see a growing trend
in Europe and Canada.
If the Supreme Court is willing to rely on foreign jurisprudence in
a marriage law case, the trend in Europe and Canada could sway the
Court against a state DOMA. On the other hand, if the Court looks tojurisprudence across all of the 192 independent nations of the
world,159 it might well conclude differently. Only two countries (the
Netherlands and Denmark) have sanctioned homosexual marriages
on a national level, and that has occurred only within the last three
years. 16o Marriage has been a male-female institution across civiliza-
tions for thousands of years.
It remains to be seen whether foreign jurisprudence will come into
play if and when the Court addresses the constitutionality of a state
153. Id. at 2007 (quoting the Dutch Act on the Opening up of Marriage for Same-Sex
Partners (Kees Waaldijk trans.)).
154. Id. at 2007-08.
155. Id. at 2008.
156. Id.
157. Michelle Mann, Will Canada Lead the Way in Same-Sex Marriages? Winds of
Change in the United States May Come From Up North, 2 No. 27 A.B.A. J. E-
REPORT 5 (July 11, 2003).
158. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (citing Halpern v. Toronto
(City), 172 O.A.C. 276 (2003)).
159. See BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET:
INDEPENDENT STATES IN THE WORLD (Feb. 27, 2004), at http://www.state.gov/s/inr/
rls/4250.htm.
160. See Developments in the Law, supra note 152, at 2004 ("[I]n 1989 ... same-sex
marriage was not legal anywhere in the world .... Same-sex marriage has been
legal in the Netherlands since April 2001 and Belgium . . . [since] early 2003.").
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DOMA, but its use in the preservation of marriage context is unlikely.
In overruling Bowers, the majority in Lawrence cited actions of the
British Parliament and decisions from the European Court of Human
Rights.16 1 Lawrence should not be viewed, however, as establishing a
precedent for appealing to foreign law, because Lawrence only dis-
cussed foreign law to counter the "Western civilization" language of
Bowers. Moreover, the Supreme Court historically has been hesitant
to appeal to foreign authority. 16 2 If substantive due process funda-
mental rights analysis continues to focus on American history and tra-
dition, foreign law and trends should be of little or no relevance.
C. Due Process Analysis
The Lawrence Court framed the issue as "whether the petitioners
were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of
their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution."16 3 The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."16 4 The Supreme Court concluded that
the right to liberty under this amendment gave the petitioners in
Lawrence a right to engage in homosexual conduct without interfer-
ence from the government. 165 Furthermore, the Court held that
Texas could not justifiably forbid such conduct because it lacked a le-
gitimate state interest in doing so.16 6 The Court apparently found in-
sufficient the state's two professed purposes in promulgating the
homosexual sodomy statute, which were (1) avoiding litigation based
on a broader predecessor statute that impacted married couples, and
(2) the promotion of morality,16 7 as well as any other conceivable ra-
tionale for the statute.
This section will examine the Supreme Court's substantive due
process methodology generally, as well as the analysis undertaken by
the Court in Lawrence. Discussing Lawrence in light of the Court's
traditional due process methodology, however, is a tricky task.168 The
due process analysis in Lawrence does not fit well with established
Court patterns. Not much discussion is made in Lawrence about
traditional due process concepts like "fundamental rights" or "state in-
terests"; nor is a balancing of the asserted liberty interest against a
state interest ever fleshed out. The Court simply announces, without
161. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 125.
163. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476 (2003).
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
165. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
166. Id.
167. See Respondent's Brief at 41-42, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
168. See infra notes 179-201 and accompanying text.
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explanation, that the sodomy law "furthers no legitimate state inter-
est which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of
the individual."169 Borrowing language from Gertrude Stein's
description of Oakland, in Lawrence "[tihere is no there there."170
Lawrence seems to be a result without reason, at least when lined up
with the Court's established methodology in due process
jurisprudence.
In general, the Supreme Court engages in substantive due process
analysis in order to determine whether the liberty interest allegedly
infringed upon is one that is protected by the Due Process Clause. The
Court's method for substantive due process analysis is set out in
Washington v. Glucksberg,17 1 a case in which the Court upheld state
bans on assisted suicide. First, claimants wishing to receive height-
ened protection for an asserted right or liberty must meet a "threshold
requirement" by showing that it is fundamental.17 2 Fundamental
rights or liberties are those that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.., and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacri-
ficed."173 Second, the Court requires a "careful description of the as-
serted fundamental liberty interest."174 That is, the claimant must
show that the asserted right, described with specificity, is objectively
deeply rooted in the history and tradition of the American people. The
Court takes this two-step substantive due process approach "to rein in
the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due-process ju-
dicial review."175 The Court is reluctant to break new ground by de-
claring an asserted right as "fundamental," realizing that extending
such Constitutional protection to an asserted liberty interest takes the
matter, to a great extent, out of the arena of public debate and out of
the hands of legislatures. 17 6
If these demanding criteria are met, the asserted liberty will re-
ceive heightened protection against governmental interference. To
justify a state regulation restricting a fundamental liberty interest,
the state must demonstrate that it has a compelling state interest and
169. 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
170. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY ch. 4 (1937), as quoted in BART-
LErT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 627:13 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
171. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). See Richard F. Duncan, They Call Me "Eight Eyes" Hard-
wick's Respectability, Romer's Narrowness, and Same-Sex Marriage, 32 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 241, 246-48 (1998), and Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and
the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, for two excellent discus-
sions on the due process method articulated in Glucksberg.
172. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
173. Id. at 721 (internal citations omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 722.
176. Id. at 720.
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that the enactment is narrowly-tailored to achieve that interest.17
7
On the other hand, if a law does not burden a fundamental right, the
state need only show "a reasonable relation to a legitimate state inter-
est to justify the action."' 7 8 This is called rational relationship or ra-
tional basis review.
1. Was a Fundamental Right to Sodomy Implicitly Identified in
Lawrence?
Trying to line up Lawrence's murky substantive due process analy-
sis with the Court's traditional methodology is a difficult task. If a
fundamental right to sodomy was identified in Lawrence, one would
expect to find strict scrutiny in the opinion. What level of scrutiny
was applied in Lawrence? It is hard to tell. In announcing its holding,
the Court appeared to apply the rational basis test, concluding that
the Texas sodomy statute did not further any legitimate state interest
to justify its intrusion into an individual's privacy.17 9 Application of
the lowest level of scrutiny would imply that no fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy was identified. However, several as-
pects of the majority opinion make it appear as if the Court applied
some form of heightened scrutiny and perhaps, discovered a new (but
unannounced) fundamental right to sodomy and adult consensual sex.
First, the Court overruled Bowers, which had found no fundamen-
tal liberty interest in homosexual conduct. Also, in overruling Bowers,
the Court questioned the historical analysis upon which Bowers was
decided. An analysis of history is one of the main inquiries the Court
makes when determining whether a right is fundamental. The Court
described several instances in the "history of Western civilization" (at
least since 1957) where "other authorities point[ed] in an opposite di-
rection"1 8 0 from the premise, relied on in Bowers, that homosexual
conduct had historically been subjected to state intervention. A large
portion of the Lawrence opinion details how reaction to homosexual
conduct has changed over the years and how there is now "an emerg-
ing awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult per-
sons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex."18 1 Lawrence includes a discussion of history in re-
sponse to Bowers, but the Court never makes it clear whether it un-
dertook this historical analysis for the purpose of defining a
fundamental right under substantive due process.
The fact that recent trends and an "emerging awareness" were sig-
nificant to the Court is a notable deviation from previous due process
177. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156 (1973).
178. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
179. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
180. Id. at 2481.
181. Id. at 2480.
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inquiries. In Glucksberg, for example, Justice Souter maintained that
"an emerging issue like assisted suicide" should be left to state legisla-
tures for experimentation, factfinding, and consideration.I8 2 Justice
Scalia criticized the majority in Lawrence for disregarding proper sub-
stantive due process analysis, expressing that an "emerging aware-
ness" by definition fails the "deeply rooted" query that "'fundamental
right' status requires."1 s3
Also pointing to an implicit fundamental liberty interest in homo-
sexual conduct is the fact that Lawrence's liberty interest in private
conduct was an extension of the privacy rights announced in Gris-
wold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey. Roe v. Wade had previously posited
a threshold where "only personal rights deemed 'fundamental' or 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee
of personal privacy."18 4 In Lawrence, the court brought homosexual
conduct under this burgeoning umbrella of privacy rights.
Furthermore, if the Court had actually performed a rational basis
review (as opposed to some form of heightened scrutiny), it seems un-
likely that the Texas statute would have been struck down. Rational
basis is the lowest level of scrutiny. It is the most deferential to a
state's judgment. Under rational basis review, a state statute is pre-
sumptively constitutional.1 8 5 The law in question will ordinarily be
upheld if it advances any legitimate state interest, even if the Court
itself thinks that the law represents bad or unwise policy.18 6 Persons
challenging legislation under rational basis review have the burden of
showing not only that the state's purported interests are illegitimate,
but also that no conceivable basis exists to support the legislation.187
Under a true rational basis test, the Court likely would have found
some conceivable state interest rationally related to the Texas legisla-
ture's decision to prohibit homosexual sex. For example, the Texas
Physicians Resource Council filed an amicus brief in Lawrence argu-
ing that the Texas homosexual sodomy statute advanced a legitimate
state interest in public health.18s The brief described evidence show-
182. 521 U.S. at 789 (emphasis added).
183. 123 S. Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
185. See Federal Communications v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 314
(1993).
186. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
187. See Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315.
188. See Brief of Amici Curiae Texas Physicians Resource Council et al., Lawrence
(No. 02-102). After Lawrence, a state interest in public health was held to be
rationally related to a Kansas statute which punished heterosexual sodomy be-
tween adults and children less severely than homosexual sodomy between adults
and children because "[m]edical literature is replete with articles suggesting that
certain health risks are more generally associated with homosexual activity than
with heterosexual activity." Kansas v. Limon, 2004 WL 177649, at *8 (Kan. App.
Jan. 30, 2004), remanded from, Limon v. Kansas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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ing that anal sex causes more health complications than vaginal
sex.18 9 It also cited CDC studies that have "identified men who have
sex with men as among the groups that 'are most vulnerable to STDs
and their consequences,""190 and reported that "[riesearchers estimate
that men who have sex with men.., still account for 42 percent of new
HIV infections annually in the United States and for 60 percent of all
new HIV infections among men."19 1 In addition to state interests in
public health, an amicus brief by Texas legislators asserted that the
sodomy statute was rationally related to the state's interest in promot-
ing marriage and procreation as one of many Texas statutes encourag-
ing marriage and discouraging sex outside of it.192 Certainly public
health (at the core of a state's police power) and the encouragement of
marriage would seem to be legitimate state interests under rational
relationship review.
It seems reasonable to suggest that if the Court had actually en-
gaged in its traditional rational basis review in Lawrence, it would
have found a reasonable or rational relationship between the Texas
sodomy statute and some legitimate state interest, even if the Su-
preme Court's policy preferences differed from those of the people of
Texas.19 3 These aspects indicate that the majority may have applied
some form of heightened scrutiny, implicitly announcing a fundamen-
tal right to sodomy, or in the alternative merely decided to second-
guess the legislature and "veto" the law.
2. No Fundamental Right to Sodomy Identified in Lawrence
On the other hand, the holding of Lawrence is couched in classic
rational basis language: "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate
state interest."'194 This suggests that no fundamental right to sodomy
or adult consensual sex was identified. If it had been, strict scrutiny
would have been applied.
Nowhere does the Court describe the liberty interest as fundamen-
tal.19 5 Moreover, the Court did not implement the traditional due pro-
189. Brief of Amici Curiae Texas Physicians Resource Council et al. at 7-8, Lawrence
(No. 02-102).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 16.
192. Brief of Amici Curiae Texas Legislators at 17-25, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
193. See 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2498 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (commenting that if
Justice Thomas was "a member of the Texas Legislature" he "would vote to repeal
it," but noting the Constitution did not empower the Court to help the
petitioners).
194. 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
195. Id. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and
Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding that "it is a
strained and ultimately incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret it to announce
a new fundamental right"); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003).
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cess methodology, described in Glucksberg, used for identifying a
fundamental right. The Eleventh Circuit has identified the points of
analysis that the Lawrence court overlooked. 196 First, the Lawrence
Court did not inquire whether protecting the right of homosexual sod-
omy or private sexual intimacy was deeply rooted in the history and
tradition of this nation.19 7 Although the Court did analyze history, 198
the purpose of that examination was to challenge the history set forth
in Bowers and the focus was on laws directed against private homo-
sexual conduct. 199 Second, a "careful description" of the liberty inter-
est was never given. The Court chose instead to characterize the
constitutional liberty interests with "sweeping generality."
20 0
It is unlikely that a fundamental right to sodomy was identified in
Lawrence. Yet, because of the Court's convoluted due process analy-
sis, it is difficult to say with certainty oae way or the other. There is
just enough fodder in the opaque troughs of Lawrence to feed either
side of the argument. If a fundamental right to homosexual conduct
was discovered, why would the Court not express it? Why not look for
whether Texas had a compelling (or even an important) interest for
implementing the sodomy law? The Court might have been wary of
the ramifications that such a finding could have for other issues like
same-sex marriage. 20 1
IV. LAWRENCE'S IMPACT UPON NEBRASKA'S MARRIAGE
PROVISION SHOULD BE MINIMAL
Any analysis of the repercussions Lawrence might have on the va-
lidity of Nebraska's DOMA must include the following questions: Is
same-sex marriage a fundamental right? Can Nebraska demonstrate
a greater state interest for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples
than Texas did for criminalizing sodomy? This Part argues that Law-
rence's impact upon state DOMAs should be minimal, because
whether a state can criminalize sodomy is a much different issue than
whether a state is permitted to recognize only opposite-sex relation-
ships for purposes of granting the benefits, protections, and responsi-
bilities of marriage. First, criminal sodomy laws and marriage laws
differ in their effect and in their history. Next, a state may not be able
to show a legitimate state interest in criminalizing sodomy, but it can
196. Lofton, 358 F.3d 804.
197. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817 n.15.
198. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
199. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817 n.15.
200. Id. at 817 n.15.
201. In fact, days after the Lawrence decision two gay men in Arizona applied for a
marriage license, asserting that Lawrence implicitly recognized a fundamental
right to enter a same-sex marriage. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 451 (holding no fun-
damental right to enter a same-sex marriage).
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demonstrate a legitimate state interest in upholding traditional mar-
riage. Finally, the Supreme Court explicitly limited its holding in
Lawrence to sodomy laws, excluding any implications for existing mar-
riage laws.
A. Different Types of Laws
The sodomy law struck down in Lawrence was a criminal prohibi-
tion. The Lawrence majority emphasized that whether or not a homo-
sexual relationship is entitled to formal state recognition, a person
should be able to choose such a relationship without being punished as
a criminal.202 Justice O'Connor said that the law "brand[ed] all homo-
sexuals as criminals."2 03 In Texas, persons discovered by law enforce-
ment in a sexual act with another person of the same sex were sent to
jail.204 If convicted, an offender faced far-reaching consequences. For
example, he or she would be subject to "sexual offender" registries in
several states. 2 05 A criminal record would follow the offender perma-
nently, making job searches difficult.206 Moreover, a criminal offense
in and of itself subjects an offender to discrimination in the public and
private spheres.207
Nebraska's marriage amendment, on the other hand, does not sub-
ject any person to criminal prosecution. No same-sex couple can be
jailed because of it. The amendment simply defines what type of rela-
tionship will receive formal recognition in Nebraska. It does not
brand "all homosexuals as criminals" any more than it brands as
criminals those who are unmarried, persons under the legal age to
marry, or close relatives seeking to be married. Just because someone
is ineligible to marry under the state definition of "marriage" does not
put a criminal stigma on that person. A sixteen-year-old person who
wishes to marry, but cannot legally do so until she is seventeen, is not
a criminal, she just does not qualify to marry under state marriage
policy. 208
Furthermore, whereas Texas prohibited sexual relations between
people of the same gender, Nebraska's DOMA does not prohibit gay,
lesbian, or bisexual persons from having intimate relationships with
one another. Neither does it prohibit such persons from having public
ceremonies to express their love for one another. Rather, the amend-
202. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003).
203. Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 2476 ("The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody over night, and
charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace.").
205. See id. at 2482.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (Reissue 1998) ("At the time of the marriage the
male must be of the age of seventeen years or upward, and the female of the age
of seventeen years or upward.").
[Vol. 83:179
NOT ON "SHAKY GROUNDS"
ment sets forth marriage between a man and woman as the preferred
type of relationship, a relationship set apart for special state endorse-
ment and protection. 20 9 Marriage has always enjoyed a favored and
protected status in our country. The Supreme Court has affirmed that
"it is not unconstitutional for the State to give categorical preference"
to the marriage relationship. 2 10
Additionally, the statute in Lawrence criminalized private, consen-
sual sexual behavior. The Court made it clear that its decision was
limited to private conduct made illegal by a criminal law. Texas pro-
vided no state interest legitimate enough to justify this intrusion into
someone's personal and private life. The Court relied on several ear-
lier cases where the right of privacy had been developed and ex-
panded, thereby calling into question both the holding in Bowers and
the Texas sodomy statute.2 11 Indeed, most people might be uncom-
fortable with the type of surveillance that would be needed for rigor-
ous enforcement of a criminal sodomy law. The thought of
government agents performing house-to-house searches for sodomy
law violators conflicts with many Americans' concept of constitutional
liberty. Americans probably generally feel that their private sexual
conduct should not be intruded upon by the government, provided that
such conduct is not a criminal act under existing laws meant to pre-
vent the harming of another person.
Unlike the criminal statute in Lawrence, Nebraska's DOMA does
not infringe upon anyone's right of privacy. No private act was jeop-
ardized or exposed when the amendment was passed. As in Lawrence,
homosexual persons in Nebraska "are entitled to respect for their pri-
vate lives."2 12 That principle is not contravened by the state marriage
amendment, since the amendment does not regulate what a person
can or cannot do in private. It does not infringe upon a person's (mar-
ried or unmarried) liberty to make "individual decisions . . . concern-
209. See Richard F. Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent
Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Response to Professor Koppel-
man, 6 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 147, 159 (1997).
210. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (holding the California statute's
presumption that husband of child's mother is child's father does not violate un-
wed putative father's rights under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment).
211. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (discussing that the right of pri-
vacy is "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law prohibiting the
use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital
privacy).
212. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
2004]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:179
ing the intimacies of their physical relationship. 213 Rather,
Nebraska's DOMA affirms traditional marriage as the ideal type of
relationship for family formation while withholding public recognition
of same-sex unions and other non-marital relationships. Those who
would petition the state to grant them a formal endorsement of their
same-sex relationship do not seek to protect their privacy, but instead
are seeking public affirmation of their relationship. 2 14
Finally, Nebraska's DOMA did not take away any existing rights
or protections already enjoyed by homosexual persons. When a crimi-
nal law is enacted, it makes certain previously acceptable conduct in-
stantly punishable. 2 15 However, the marriage amendment did not
change the legal status of homosexuals in Nebraska. The first clause
of the amendment merely codified the status quo as to the accepted
definition of marriage in Nebraska. State marriage laws had already
presumed that marriage was between a man and a woman.2 16 Fur-
thermore, no existing legislation or protections afforded homosexuals
were altered or repealed under the second clause of Section 29.217 For
instance, state laws carrying civil and criminal penalties for violence
or threats against a person based on his or her sexual orientation still
have full effect. 218 Private entities are also unaffected by the amend-
ment. Private corporations and non-profits can still choose to recog-
nize same-sex relationships by extending benefits to partners of gay
and lesbian employees. Religious organizations are free to recognize
whatever relationships they choose. Thus, unlike the enactment of a
213. Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
214. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 978 (Mass. 2003) (Spina,
J., dissenting) (discussing privacy protection and noting that traditional state
marriage provision respected the private lives of homosexual plaintiffs, but
"[i]ronically, by extending the marriage laws [in Massachusetts] to same-sex
couples the court has turned substantive due process on its head and used it to
interject government into the plaintiffs' lives"); cf Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of
Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) ('[T]he asserted
liberty interest [in adoption] is not the negative right to engage in private conduct
without facing criminal sanctions, but the affirmative right to receive official and
public recognition. Hence, we conclude that the Lawrence decision cannot be ex-
trapolated to create a right to adopt for homosexual persons.").
215. Although not a criminal statute, one of the problems with Colorado's amendment
in Romer v. Evans was that it took away already existing protections based on
sexual orientation. The amendment's effect on the legal status of homosexuals
was "[s]weeping and comprehensive." 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996).
216. See supra note 70.
217. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-110 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (a person has right to live
free from violence or threats regardless of sexual orientation); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-111 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (enhanced penalty for enumerated criminal offenses
against a person including because of sexual orientation); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
114 (Cum. Supp. -2002) (commission formed to monitor enumerated criminal of-
fenses, including those based on sexual orientation).
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criminal law, the legal status of homosexuals in Nebraska the day af-
ter the marriage amendment had passed remained the same as it had
been the day before.2 19
Therefore, the two laws-Nebraska's marriage amendment and
the Texas sodomy statute-are two very different types of laws. Ne-
braska's marriage provision is not a criminal statute. In Lawrence,
the Supreme Court recognized a distinction between state marriage
laws and criminal sodomy regulations, emphasizing that Lawrence did
not involve "whether the government must give formal recognition to
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."220 Whether
a state can grant favored status to a relationship is a very different
question from whether a state can make "private sexual conduct a
crime." 22 1 The effect of legalizing sodomy is to produce permitted be-
havior while the public recognition of same-sex unions would result in
preferred behavior.22 2 The issues addressed in a state sodomy statute
are distinguishable from the issues addressed in a state DOMA.
Thus, a decision regarding the validity of one should not impact the
validity of the other.
B. Historical Differences Between the Two Issues
A significant historical difference exists between the issue ad-
dressed by a criminal sodomy law (i.e., the criminalization of certain
private sexual conduct) and the issue addressed by Nebraska's consti-
tutional marriage provision (i.e., the preservation of the definition of
marriage). The majority and the dissent in Lawrence debated as to
whether or not there had been a longstanding tradition of directing
legislation against sodomy, and to the extent that there had been,
whether or not such laws had actually been enforced. 22 3 In response
to an assertion in Bowers that "[piroscriptions against [homosexual
sodomy] ha[d] ancient roots,"224 the majority proposed that histori-
cally, sodomy laws were directed more at nonprocreative sex in gen-
eral rather than at homosexual sex.22 5 Furthermore, to refute the
219. It is true that those wanting the State to confer marital recognition on same-sex
relationship, now must first amend the state constitution. This aspect, however,
does not lower the legal status of homosexuals. Those who oppose the marriage
provision have the same opportunity to gather support and amend the constitu-
tion as any other group that would like to change some constitutional provision.
220. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
221. Id.
222. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 61.
223. Compare Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-79, with id. at 2493-94 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
224. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192
(1986)).
225. Id. at 2479.
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premise of a concurring opinion in Bowers that government interven-
tion against homosexual conduct had been existent throughout the
history of Western civilization, 2 26 the majority declared, "[in all
events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century
are of most relevance here."22 7 It then went on to discuss how sodomy
laws had been repealed in most states and how other nations in the
Western world had already decided against the criminalization of ho-
mosexual conduct. 2 28
It may or may not be true that laws directed against homosexual
conduct have a longstanding historical tradition. That determination
is not the focus of this Note. It seems at least to be a debatable pro-
position, since proponents on either side produce evidence for their po-
sition.229 However, there is very little debate over the notion that
marriage has a longstanding history of being a union between a man
and a woman. Our legal tradition reflects this, defining marriage as
the "legal union between a man and woman as husband and wife." 230
Marriage has been limited to a man and a woman throughout the his-
tory of our country.2 3 1 In 1878, for example, the Supreme Court re-
jected an argument that religious practice was a sufficient
justification for violating a polygamy law that restricted marriage to
226. Id. at 2480 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
227. Id. at 2480.
228. Id. at 2480-81.
229. See supra notes 54-60, 223 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631 (suggesting
that the Bowers analysis of sodomy laws had virtually no connection with the
historical understanding of eighteenth or mid-nineteenth century regulators);
Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for
the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1074-75
(1988) (asserting that "historical accounts" in Bowers "are certainly misleading,
and, in some cases, inaccurate as well."); but see, e.g., Survey on the Constitu-
tional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV.
521, 525 (1986) (stating: "Current state laws prohibiting homosexual intercourse
are ancient in origin."); Edward P. Steggmann, Note, Of History and Due Process,
63 IND. L.J. 369, 381-86 (1988) (asserting that Western civilization has a history
of condemning sodomy).
230. BLACies LAW DICTIONARY 986 (7th ed. 1999); see also Dean v. District of Colum-
bia, 653 A.2d 307, 315 (D.C. 1995) (stating that the understanding of marriage in
the early 1900s was of one man and one woman) (referring to BAc's LAw Dic-
TIONARY 762 (2d ed. 1910)); Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Marriage Between
Persons of Same Sex, 81 A.L.R.5TH 1, § 2 (2000) ("Except for Vermont's recently
passed civil union act, existing statutory law reflects no such extension [of mar-
riage to same-sex couples]: the courts that have addressed the issue have uni-
formly held that the marriage statutes ... permit only opposite-sex marriage.");
Elisa Laird, Student Essay, The Law is Straight and Narrow: How American
Courts Define Families, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 221, 222-23 (2003) ("Heterosex-
ual families have always been protected by the laws and enjoy the benefits-
social and legal-bestowed by the larger system.").
231. See generally, Wardle, supra note 222, at 32-37 (arguing that "[h]istory, experi-
ence, and precedent refute the same-sex marriage claim").
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just one man and one woman. 232 Historically, although cultures had
varying criteria for marriage (e.g., some have permitted polygamy or
endogamy), none recognized marriages between people of the same
sex.
2 3 3
As for recent history, the Lawrence Court examined laws and juris-
prudence in the United States and other Western nations over the
past fifty years and found an "emerging awareness" that homosexual
conduct should not be punishable by criminal laws. 23 4 Prior to Law-
rence, states had been systematically abolishing legislation that
criminalized sodomy.23 5 Nebraska, for instance, eliminated its sod-
omy law in 1978.236 Although all fifty states had outlawed sodomy
before 1961, only thirteen states continued to prohibit such conduct in
2003. Four of those states had laws directed only against homosexual
conduct. 23 7 As discussed supra, the Court also found it persuasive
that international courts and other nations had recently struck down
laws prohibiting sexual activity between people of the same sex.2 38
Thus, the fact that recent public perception had changed so greatly
over the past half-century was significant to the fact that Texas's sod-
omy statute was found unconstitutional.
Although recent trends before Lawrence might have shown a re-
laxing of public perception towards sexual conduct among gays and
lesbians and a waning significance of laws that criminalized sodomy,
quite the opposite is true when it comes to the notion of traditional
marriage. Already deeply rooted in our nation's history, there has
been a significant reaffirmation in recent years of the principle that
marriage is a union between a man and a woman. In 1996, Congress
passed the federal DOMA, defining marriage as a union between one
man and one woman for federal purposes, and providing that a state
may refuse to recognize a same-sex relationship treated as a marriage
in another state.2 39 Additionally, at least thirty-eight states have
passed legislation or constitutional amendments that preserve the
232. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
233. See George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581,
583-84 (1999). Contra William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage
79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993); but see Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer:
Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 239, 249-50
(1998) (criticizing Eskridge's article).
234. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480-81 (2003).
235. See id. at 2480; see also Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79
N.C. L. REV. 359, 480-81 (2001) ("More recently, the trend toward decriminaliza-
tion [of sodomy] has resumed.").
236. Nebraska's sodomy statute (formerly NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-919 (Reissue 1975))
was repealed when a new criminal code was adopted in 1977, 1977 Neb. Laws 38
§ 328, and made effective July 1, 1978, id. § 325.
237. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
238. See id. at 2481, 2483.
239. See supra note 64.
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definition of marriage to the traditional meaning of one man and one
woman. 2 40 It appears that this trend of state action is continuing.24 1
Action such as this by the country's legislatures is perhaps the "clear-
est and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values."24 2
Moreover, Lawrence highlights recent caselaw, whose holdings
suggested that criminal sodomy statutes were going to fall. The ma-
jority in Lawrence discussed two post-Bowers decisions that had
eroded the foundation of Bowers: Casey (emphasizing personal auton-
omy) and Romer (invalidating a state amendment directed at homo-
sexuals because of its excessive breadth and because it was born out of
animosity).243 The Court also noted that five state courts had refused
to follow Bowers in state due process decisions. 24 4
In contrast, if the Court was to look for caselaw regarding the issue
of marriage, it would find that courts have mostly refused to alter the
definition of marriage to include same-sex unions. Although the Su-
preme Court has not yet addressed the question of same-sex marriage,
lower courts have consistently upheld the traditional notion of mar-
riage. A wave of litigation failed during the 1970s in which homosexu-
als sought to invalidate statutes limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples. 245 More recently, courts for the most part continue to uphold
the validity of using the traditional definition of marriage in civil mar-
riage provisions.2 46 Just days after Lawrence was decided, two homo-
sexual men applied for a marriage license in Arizona. Upon being
denied a license, the men challenged Arizona's prohibition of same-sex
marriages arguing that Lawrence implicitly recognized a fundamental
right to enter a same-sex marriage.2 47 An Arizona court rejected the
240. See supra note 63.
241. See NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 351 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 4th ed. 2003)
("[Sleveral dozen states . . . have passed laws prohibiting same sex marriages.
There are many states that currently have similar legislation pending."). See
also Foes, supra note 63, at 1A.
242. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 331 (1989)).
243. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481-82.
244. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
245. Miller, supra note 230. A case often cited from the 1970s is Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), which held that same-sex marriage was not authorized
by state statutes nor compelled by the U.S. Constitution.
246. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-23 (D. Cal. 1980);
Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Dean v.
District of Columbia, 653 A.2d. 307, 310-31 (D.C. 1995); Succession of Bacot, 502
So. 2d 1118, 1130 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996); In re Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1990),
affd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio
Prob. 1987); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 955-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
247. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 451.
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contention that Lawrence stood for such a proposition and upheld the
state's marriage statutes.248
On the other hand, four state courts have recognized either a right
to same-sex marriage or a marriage equivalent, all under state consti-
tutional provisions.2 49 Two of those decisions (in Alaska and Hawaii)
were subsequently overruled by state constitutional amendments.2 50
Vermont created same-sex "civil unions" and continues to reserve civil
marriages to opposite-sex couples. 251 Massachusetts grants civil mar-
riages to same-sex couples as of May 2004, but this policy could prove
to be a short-lived, since lawmakers have already begun to move to-
wards amending the state constitution-a process that would take
about two years.2 52 The situation in Massachusetts seems to be fol-
lowing a similar pattern as seen in Alaska, Hawaii, and Vermont-
that when a court rules against a traditional marriage policy, the
state legislature follows with some action aimed at overturning or
tempering the court's ruling.
As noted, the few courts that have identified a right to same-sex
marriage or some marriage-like union have done so under state con-
stitutions. Since Nebraska's marriage provision is a part of the state
constitution, any challenge to it would have to be brought under the
U.S. Constitution. No court has yet held that the right to enter a
same-sex marriage is a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Accordingly, most courts continue to support the traditional defi-
nition of marriage and the state policies protecting that definition.
In summary, the history of marriage laws and the history of crimi-
nal sodomy laws are quite different. The historical acceptance of mar-
riage as between a man and a woman is unquestioned, while the
historical basis for criminal homosexual sodomy laws seems at least to
be debatable. Whereas states tended to abolish criminal sodomy laws
before Lawrence, overwhelming support for traditional marriage con-
tinues to be reaffirmed as exemplified in recent state constitutional
amendments, federal and state legislation, and court cases. Conse-
quently, Lawrence's decision to strike down criminal sodomy laws does
not cast doubt upon a state DOMA.
C. Preserving Traditional Marriage Advances Legitimate
State Interests
A court reviewing the constitutionality of Nebraska's DOMA under
either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the
248. Id. at 457, 465.
249. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 66.
251. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
252. Court Again Backs Gay Marriages: Same-Sex Civil Unions Not Enough-Massa-
chusetts Ruling, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Feb. 5, 2004, at 1A.
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Fourteenth Amendment will most likely apply a deferential rational
relationship review-meaning that the State of Nebraska will merely
have to demonstrate that its marriage amendment is rationally re-
lated to some legitimate government interest. Minimal scrutiny will
most likely be applied, because the Supreme Court is ordinarily defer-
ential to states when it comes to regulations concerning family af-
fairs25 3 and it has never expressly subjected any legislation impacting
homosexual persons to heightened scrutiny. Homosexuality is neither
a "suspect" classification (e.g., race, ethnic, or religious classifications)
nor a "quasi-suspect" classification. (e.g., gender). Neither homosex-
ual conduct 2 54 nor same-sex marriages 2 55 are considered fundamental
rights.
Under Glucksberg, an alleged liberty interest in same-sex mar-
riage would not receive heightened protection. First, the liberty inter-
est must be articulated with specificity. In other words, one cannot
simply argue that gays and lesbians have a right to marry. Rather,
the question is whether there is a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage. It cannot reasonably be said that same-sex marriage is a
fundamental right. It is not deeply rooted within the traditions and
longstanding history of our nation. Since same-sex marriage is not a
fundamental right, a court would most likely apply the rational-basis
test.
It is true that some legislation impacting gays and lesbians has
failed rational relationship review, but Nebraska's DOMA is not
plagued by the same difficulties. In Romer v. Evans, for instance, the
Colorado amendment in question failed rational relationship review
253. See Developments in the Law, supra note 152, at 2014.
254. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2492 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (hold-
ing that the Court has not described sexual conduct among homosexuals as a
fundamental right or liberty interest and that the Texas sodomy law was not
subjected to strict scrutiny); see generally Note, Homosexuals' Right to Marry: A
Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 202-06
(1979) [hereinafter Homosexuals' Right to Marry] (arguing that homosexuality is
not a suspect classification).
255. See Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) ("The
history of the law's treatment of marriage as an institution involving one man
and one woman, together with recent, explicit reaffirmations of that view, lead
invariably to the conclusion that the right to enter a same-sex marriage is not a
fundamental liberty interest protected by due process."); Dean v. District of Co-
lumbia, 653 A.2d 307, 331 (D.C. 1995) ("[S]ame-sex marriage is not a 'fundamen-
tal right' protected by the due process clause."); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56
(Haw. 1993) ("[C]ase law demonstrates that the ... fundamental right to marry
... presently contemplates unions between men and women."). See also Wardle,
supra note 222, at 26 (arguing that "there is no constitutional right to same-sex
marriage"); Homosexuals' Right to Marry, supra note 254, at 200-02 (discussing
the traditional definition of marriage and the Supreme Court's decision in
Zablocki v. Redhail and concluding that "same-sex marriage cannot realistically
be regarded as a fundamental right").
[Vol. 83:179
NOT ON "SHAKY GROUNDS"
because of the law's excessive breadth and because it was inexplicable
by anything but animus toward gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.256 Ne-
braska's provision, on the other hand, was not enacted with a desire to
harm homosexual persons. 25 7 It, like other state DOMAs, is also nar-
row enough for a court to perceive a reasonable relationship to its pur-
ported ends.258 In Lawrence, the sodomy statute failed rational
relationship review, because it was too intrusive into private lives.259
In contrast, neither private conduct nor private relationships are in-
truded upon by Nebraska's DOMA.
When a court reviews a regulation under a rational relationship
review, it does not decide whether, in the court's opinion, the law is
wise or unwise, or whether the judges would have voted for it if they
were legislators. Rather, a court looks to see if some legitimate gov-
ernmental interest is advanced. So long as the law is rationally re-
lated to a conceivable legitimate state interest, it will be sustained,
even if it seems to disadvantage a particular group. 2 60 Hence, a court
reviewing the constitutionality of Nebraska's DOMA will ask whether
defining marriage as a dual-gender institution and withholding for-
mal recognition to same-sex relationships advances any conceivable
legitimate government interest. This section argues that Nebraska's
marriage provision is rationally related to legitimate state interests.
Marriage (as between one man and one woman) enjoys a rich his-
tory and tradition in our society and the government has historically
encouraged marriage through public policy.2 6 1 "Upon [marriage] soci-
ety may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations
and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessa-
rily required to deal."2 62 Recognizing the importance of marriage, the
256. 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
257. Regarding a similar definitional provision found in the Federal DOMA, a scholar
who argues for its unconstitutionality concedes that "[olne cannot confidently in-
fer, simply by considering the definitional provision on its face, that [DOMA's]
purpose is a desire to harm the group." Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA:
Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IowA L. REV. 1, 8 (1997)
(arguing that the choice of law provision, not the marriage definition, makes fed-
eral DOMA unconstitutional). But see Evan Wolfson and Michael F. Melcher,
The Supreme Court's Decision in Romer v. Evans and Its Implications for the
Defense of Marriage Act, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 217 (1996) ("Because DOMA re-
flects the same animus, the same 'across the board' inequality, and the same at-
tempt to create a disfavored class (of lawful marriages), it is unconstitutional.").
258. See Duncan, supra note 209, at 156.
259. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
260. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
261. For a good discussion on why it is a valid interest for a state's public policy to
foster, protect, and encourage marriage, see Peden v. State, 930 P.2d 1, 14-17
(Kan. 1996) (upholding state's tax schemes favoring married couples).
262. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (discussing marriage in the
context of criminal polygamy charge).
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Supreme Court has upheld policies that promote marriage. The Court
has reasoned:
[Clertainly, no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in
the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth . . . than that which
seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and
springing from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate
of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civili-
zation; the best guaranty of that reverent morality which is the source of all
beneficent progress in social and political improvement.
2 6 3
Lawrence's invalidation of sodomy laws because no legitimate gov-
ernment interest was found does not cast doubt on the validity of laws
protecting traditional marriage. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring
opinion, affirmed the protection of traditional marriage as a legitimate
state interest, because "[u]nlike the moral disapproval of same-sex re-
lations-the asserted state interest in [Lawrence]-other reasons ex-
ist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral
disapproval of an excluded group."26 4 Thus, the preservation of tradi-
tional marriage is constitutional, because it advances legitimate state
objectives-objectives that are undiminished by the holding in
Lawrence.
Many reasons have been asserted by judges, attorneys, and schol-
ars as to why preserving the traditional definition of marriage ad-
vances legitimate state interests. 26 5 Professor Wardle writes that:
[I]mportant public interests in and social purposes for traditional marriage
. . . include (1) safe sexual relations; (2) responsible procreation; (3) optimal
child rearing; (4) healthy human development; (5) protecting those who under-
take the most vulnerable family roles for the benefit of society, especially
wives and mothers; (6) securing the stability and integrity of the basic unit of
society; (7) fostering civic virtue, democracy, and social order; and (8) facilitat-
ing interjurisdictional compatibility.2 6 6
Professor Dent adds that socializing adults and promoting per-
sonal happiness are also valid public interests connected to traditional
marriage.2 67 There are many sources available that explain these
purported interests in detail. 268 This Note will briefly promote the
idea that traditional, opposite-sex marriages advance valid state in-
263. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (discussing marriage in the context of
upholding a statute disenfranchising polygamists).
264. 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
265. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 463-64 (Ariz. App. 2003)
(holding that "the State has a legitimate interest in encouraging procreation and
child-rearing within the marital relationship, and that limiting marriage to oppo-
site-sex couples is rationally related to that interest").
266. Lynn D. Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish": Considering Same-Sex Marriage in
Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771,
779-80 (2001).
267. Dent, supra note 233 at 603-07 (1999).
268. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 233; Duncan, supra note 209, at 156-65; Wardle, supra
note 266.
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terests in promoting responsible procreation and providing for the op-
timal childrearing setting.
Nebraska has an interest in preserving and encouraging tradi-
tional, opposite-sex marriages because of the link between procreation
and marriage. Historically, procreation has been most facilitated by
the institution of marriage.26 9 The U.S. Supreme Court has linked
marriage and procreation-conferring a fundamental right on mar-
riage primarily because of this link.270 The Court has declared that
"[mlarriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race."27 1 Governments throughout history have
"extolled the virtues of procreation as a way to furnish new workers,
soldiers, and other useful members of society."2 72 States encourage
the channeling of procreative activities into the institution of mar-
riage to ensure that most children will be born into environments of
stability, to committed parents able to support the burdens of newborn
children. Surely the State is reasonable in giving a type of "favored"
status to traditional marriage because of its connection to responsible
procreation. The State has more of an interest in promoting procrea-
tive relationships than it does non-procreative relationships. Since
the perpetuation of the human race is at least a rational (if not impor-
tant or compelling) governmental interest, the institution linked inex-
tricably to procreation-traditional marriage-should be protected.
The argument is often made that if the procreative aspect of mar-
riage is reason to preclude homosexual persons from the State's defini-
tion of marriage, then heterosexual couples who cannot (or choose not
to) have children should not be permitted to marry either. There are
several reasons why this argument fails. First of all, childless hetero-
sexual married couples are the exception, not the norm. 27 3 Saying
that opposite-sex marriages should be preferred by the State because
of an interest in the propagation of the human race expresses that
marriage is the ideal setting for responsible procreation. It does not
269. For an excellent discussion on the historical link between marriage and procrea-
tion, see Wardle, supra note 266.
270. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). For further discus-
sion, see Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 332-33 (D.C. 1995) and
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56-57 (Haw. 1993).
271. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
272. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 237 (Kan. App. 2004).
273. See generally AMARA BACHU, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN MEN
15-22 (1996) (displaying and analyzing statistics showing that 85 to 86 percent of
married husbands and wives have children, while around 15 to 16 percent are
childless; see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: NATIONAL
CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, FERTILITY, FAMILY PLANNING AND WOMEN'S
HEALTH: NEW DATA FROM THE 1995 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 7
(1997), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr 23/sr23_019.pdf (only
about 7.2 percent of married couples were infertile in 1995).
2004]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
express that marriage is the only setting for procreation or that every
married couple will procreate. Furthermore, reproduction requires a
male-female union. Only the sexual union between a male and a fe-
male has the potential for reproduction. Inherently, no sexual act be-
tween two men or between two women will result in reproduction. So,
although not all heterosexual couples have children, only a heterosex-
ual couple can have sexual "acts which are reproductive in type,
whether or not they are reproductive in effect."2 74
Moreover, it would be inappropriate for the State to prohibit heter-
osexual couples from marrying based upon the inability or the lack of
intent to procreate, because, outside of medical testing or extremely
intrusive questioning, it would be impossible to tell which heterosex-
ual couples should be denied marriage licenses. 27 5 Many couples
choose to wait until they are married to engage in sexual intercourse
and thus do not know before they are married whether or not they can
have children. Even assuming that a particular couple knows before-
hand that they cannot (or will not) have any children, the State would
be forced to pose incredibly invasive questions about fertility, sexual
practices, and the couple's future plans before it could issue a mar-
riage license. These types of questions would most assuredly force the
State to pierce the "realm of personal liberty which the government
may not enter."2 76 On the other hand, the State does not have to ask
such privacy-invading questions to homosexual couples seeking to be
married, because same-sex relationships, by their nature, are non-pro-
creative. 2 77 The fact that not all heterosexual marriages produce chil-
dren, then, does not lessen the reasonableness of the State's decision
to restrict marriage to male-female unions.
Preserving the traditional institution of marriage also relates to
the State's valid purpose of encouraging an optimal family structure
for childrearing. Just as the U.S. Supreme Court has linked marriage
and procreation, it has also linked raising children with marriage. In
Meyer v. Nebraska,2 78 (noted in Lawrence for its "broad statements of
the substantive reach of liberty"2 79 ) the Court said that liberty under
the Due Process Clause denoted, among other things, the right "to
274. Robert P. George, "Same-Sex Marriage" and "Moral Neutrality," in HOMOSEXUAL-
ITY AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 141, 144 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 1999).
275. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124-25 (D. Cal. 1980); Duncan,
supra note 209, at 160-61. See also Dent, supra note 233, at 601-03 (discussing
the significance of childless heterosexual couples).
276. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)). The Court, while discussing Casey, said that
personal choice about procreation is an area central to "personal dignity," pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
277. See Duncan, supra note 209, at 161.
278. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
279. 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
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marry, establish a home and bring up children." 28o Marriage was un-
deniably related to the Court's conception of rearing children and the
Justices' notion of "marriage" almost certainly involved a male-female
union. 2 8 1
Children develop best in homes with married parents where both
the mother and father are actively involved in the parenting pro-
cess. 2 82 The sad saga of large numbers of broken homes in the United
States over the past half-century has shown that children ideally need
both parents. Children of intact, two-parent families generally fare
better than those of one-parent families under standards such as edu-
cational achievement, alcohol and drug use, criminality, and adult
earnings. 28 3 Because the father is often times missing from the
parenting role (either because he is physically absent or just
uninvolved), many initiatives have recently been undertaken to en-
courage fathers to get involved in their kids' lives.284 Such efforts re-
flect the realization that optimal child development and socialization
involves the influence of both a father and a mother. 28 5
Similarly, state public policy encourages and honors marriage, be-
cause it provides the optimal setting in which to raise children who
will grow up to be productive citizens. In fact, "[i]t is hard to conceive
an interest more legitimate and more paramount for the state than
promoting an optimal social structure for educating, socializing, and
preparing its future citizens to become productive participants in civil
society."28 6 Marriage binds mother and father together. The commit-
280. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
281. The author of this Note performed a Lexis-Nexis search of Supreme Court cases
from the 1920s dealing with the subject of marriage. Reading the context of the
Court's use of the words "marry," "marriage," and "married" during that period
reveals that when the Court discussed marriage, it was referring to the tradi-
tional male-female relationship.
282. See Dent, supra note 233, at 595; see also Peden v. State, 930 P.2d 1, 15-16 (Kan.
1996) (citing studies indicating that children fare better in homes with two mar-
ried parents); Daniel Callahan, Bioethics and Fatherhood, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 735
(recognizing that both mothers and fathers play important roles in family rela-
tionships); Sharon S. Townsend, Fatherhood: A Judicial Perspective-Unmarried
Fathers and the Changing Role of the Family Court, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 354, 356
(2003) ("[Clhildren appear better adjusted when they enjoy warm, positive rela-
tionships with two actively involved parents.").
283. Dent, supra note 233, at 594. See also Wardle, supra note 266, at 790-92 (dis-
cussing the disadvantages often faced by children in one-parent homes).
284. See, e.g., NATIONAL HEAD START ASSOCIATION, INTRODUCTION TO THE MALE AND
FATHER-INVOLVEMENT INITIATIVE: RESPONDING TO THE NEED FOR MALE INVOLVE-
MENT IN CHILDREN'S AND FAMILIES' LIVEs, at http://www.nhsa.org/parents/parents
_fatherintro.htm (last visited July 10, 2004); THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR FA-
THERING, at www.fathers.com (last visited July 10, 2004).
285. See generally, Townsend, supra note 282, at 355-57 (arguing that children de-
velop best with active involvement from a mother and a father).
286. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819
(11th Cir. 2004).
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ments spouses make and the legal responsibilities they take on help
ensure that children are raised in stable environments. The presence
of a male and female role model in the home provides an ideal environ-
ment in which children can learn about life and the world and develop
into well-rounded, stable, and productive adult citizens.
To say that the traditional male-female marriage provides the op-
timal setting for the rearing of children does not insinuate that chil-
dren from single-parent homes or homes with homosexual parents
cannot fare well. Many parents in unconventional or less-than-ideal
settings do a terrific job of raising healthy and productive children.
However, the issue for the State is about which type of family situa-
tion it should encourage most through its laws. For that decision, it
turns to the ideal family structure for the rearing of children: one hus-
band, one wife; one father, one mother. Given the vast research indi-
cating that children fare better in homes where both mother and
father are present, the State would be unwise to endorse a family
structure that deliberately excludes one or the other. If "Heather has
two mommies," 28 7 she does not have a daddy. If "Daddy's roommate"
is Frank, whose room does Mommy stay in?28 8
For long-term societal benefits, the State promotes and should con-
tinue to promote conventional dual-gender families. Former first lady
and current U.S. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton reminded Ameri-
cans that "society requires a critical mass of families that fit the tradi-
tional ideal, both to meet the needs of most children and to serve as a
model."28 9 Some studies claim that gay and lesbian couples are
equally suited for parenting as dual-gender, married couples, but such
studies have been questioned by many because of small sampling
populations, narrow time periods, and political motivations.
2 90 Al-
though alternative childrearing arrangements have been suggested,
no model has been proven over centuries of time and across cultural
287. LESLEA NEWMAN, HEATHER HAS Two MOMMIES (1989) (title of a children's fiction
book meant to introduce children to the idea of homosexual parents).
288. MICHAEL WILLHOITE, DADDY'S ROOMMATE (1990) (title of a children's fiction book
meant to introduce children to the idea of homosexual parents).
289. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN
TEACH US 50 (1996).
290. See, e.g., Lofton, 358 F.3d at 825 ("[The] legislature might be aware of the criti-
ques of the studies . . . highlight[ing] significant flaws in the studies' methodolo-
gies and conclusions."); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 999
(Mass. 2003) (Cory, J., dissenting) (noting critiques of studies); Dent, supra note
233, at 595 ("Studies of children raised by gay parents are inconclusive, partly
because samples have been so small."); George Rekers & Mark Kilgus, Studies of
Homosexual Parenting: A Critical Review, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 343 (2001-02);
Wardle, supra note 266, at 804 ("The evidence of how [being raised by same-sex
couples] affects children is, at best, highly dubious and far from clearly
positive.").
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divides to be superior to the traditional marital family structure. 2 9 1
Because Nebraska has a legitimate interest in promoting optimal chil-
drearing, it is rational to favor, promote, and protect traditional mari-
tal relationships.
In sum, the promotion of traditional marriage has historically
been, and continues to be, related to legitimate state interests. Both
federal and state governments bestow "favored" or "ideal" status upon
marriages between one man and one woman. That is, the government
encourages marriage (a preferred relationship) through laws which
yield certain requirements, benefits, and protections only to married
couples. 2 92 A policy fostering opposite-sex marriages does not mean
that unconventional relationships are thereby disparaged or forbid-
den, however. It does not necessarily follow that when one type of
relationship is recognized as the "ideal" type of family unit by state
public policy, that all other types of relationships are disfavored or
disparaged. People engage in many relationships everyday (e.g.,
friend to friend, lawyer to client, brother to sister, professor to stu-
dent) that do not qualify for "favored" or "preferred" status under the
law. That does not mean, though, that those relationships are "disfa-
vored" by the State. Public policy directs its attention to encouraging
the ideal or the best, not the exceptional or the good. It promotes situ-
ations that best benefit a healthy, stable society. Nebraska's Section
29 reserves public recognition of marriage to opposite-sex couples, yet
does not prohibit people from entering same-sex relationships.
Therefore, legitimate state interests are advanced by the promo-
tion and preservation of traditional marriage in Nebraska's constitu-
tion. The institution of marriage best facilitates responsible
procreation, which is necessary for society to flourish. Also, dual-gen-
der marriages provide the optimal setting for the rearing of children
by both a father and a mother-benefiting the State for years to come.
The Supreme Court held that the sodomy statute in Texas furthered
no legitimate state interests; yet it is unlikely that the Court's holding
would be the same with regard to the constitutionality of Nebraska's
marriage provision.
291. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819.
292. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. III, § 19 (surviving spouse of public workers entitled to
pension benefits); NEB. REV. STAT. § 12-1301 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (spouses of veter-
ans provided with lots in Nebraska government cemeteries); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 23-3522 (Reissue 1997) (both patient and patient's spouse jointly and severally
liable for medical costs); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2302 (Reissue 1995) (surviving
spouses have primary rights under intestate succession); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-
2715.02 (Reissue 2003) (married persons may file joint tax returns).
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D. The Supreme Court's Explicit Limiting of Lawrence
Perhaps the strongest reason for believing that Lawrence's impact
on the survival of Nebraska's marriage provision will be minimal is
the Supreme Court's own words. The Court explicitly limited its hold-
ing to situations where private consensual sex between adults was
made punishable under state criminal law. Just before announcing
Lawrence's holding, the Court attempted to narrow its scope, making
certain that other issues not before the Court would not be implicated.
The Court declared:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent
might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.
It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two
adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle .... The State cannot... mak[e]
their private sexual conduct a crime. 2 9 3
In another section of the majority opinion, the Court stated that peo-
ple are free to choose homosexual relationships without being crimi-
nally punished, "whether or not [such relationships are] entitled to
formal recognition in the law."294 Here again, the Court made clear
that it was not deciding whether same-sex marriage or any other
same-sex relationship was entitled to formal recognition.
Justice O'Connor asserted that just because a law banning private
homosexual conduct "is unconstitutional ... does not mean that other
laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would
similarly fail under rational basis review."295 According to O'Connor,
not only do homosexual sodomy laws address different issues than
marriage laws, but unlike the forbidding of homosexual conduct, "pre-
serving the traditional institution of marriage" is a legitimate state
interest.296 Therefore, both the majority and the concurring justice
went out of their way to limit their decisions in Lawrence to the issue
of whether a state could criminalize certain sexual conduct, thereby
excluding any implication to traditional marriage laws. Because of ex-
plicit language to the contrary, it cannot be fairly said that Lawrence
covers the issue of same-sex marriage.
293. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (emphasis added). Cf United
States v. Peterson, 294 F. Supp. 2d 797, 803 (D. N.C. 2003) (rejecting argument
that Lawrence extends due process protection to possessors of child pornography);
State v. Clark, 588 S.E.2d 66, 68-69 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting argument
that statutory rape case is controlled by Lawrence); State v. Freeman, 801 N.E.2d
906, 908-10 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting argument that Lawrence gives appel-
lant a constitutionally protected right to engage in incest with his daughter).
294. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
295. Id. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
296. Id. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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V. CONCLUSION
Will the marriage provision in Nebraska's constitution survive
Lawrence? This Note argues that it will. In Lawrence, no legitimate
state interests were found to justify the imposition of a criminal sod-
omy law. However, legitimate state purposes are advanced by Ne-
braska's decision to extend formal recognition solely to marriage
relationships between a man and a woman.
The considerable contrast between criminal sodomy laws and
traditional marriage laws is apparent. As criminal legislation, sod-
omy laws subjected offenders to criminal prosecution, punishment,
and the negative stigma that follows a criminal conviction. Section
29, on the other hand, is meant to uphold marriage and to clearly de-
fine public policy as to the type of relationships upon which the State
confers the "favored" status of marriage. It does not subject anyone to
criminal punishment or stigmatization. From a historical perspective,
most states had already abolished their sodomy laws before Lawrence.
The criminalization of sodomy, whether between homosexuals or
heterosexuals, was clearly on its way out. In contrast, most states
have recently enacted laws that preserve the traditional institution of
marriage, reaffirming a principle deeply rooted in the traditions and
history of this nation.
Although challengers may try to incorporate dicta from Lawrence
into a challenge of Nebraska's DOMA, they will have to get around the
fact that the Court explicitly restricted its holding to criminal sodomy
laws. Lawrence expressly did not cover the issue of whether states
must give formal recognition to homosexual relationships. In fact, if
such a challenge went before the U.S. Supreme Court today, it could
well be that a majority would uphold the validity of state DOMAs.
The three dissenting justices in Lawrence-Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas-would most likely uphold the
right of the people to decide for themselves, through political
processes, upon which relationships to confer formal marital recogni-
tion. The dissenting opinion emphasized that it was not the role of the
court to forbid a state from criminalizing homosexual acts or to re-
quire a state to do so, but "it is the premise of our system that those
judgments are to be made by the people, and not imposed by a gov-
erning caste that knows best" (i.e., the judiciary).2 97 The Lawrence
dissenters would quite likely apply the same logic to the issue of same-
sex marriage. 29 8 Justice O'Connor's expression that the preservation
297. Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298. While Justice Scalia authored the particular dissenting opinion quoted in the
preceding sentence, the other two justices who signed onto the dissent have ex-
pressed similar sentiments elsewhere about the right of the states to further le-
gitimate state interests by democratic action without fear of a court overturning
such action. For instance, Justice Thomas, in his own Lawrence dissent, stated
20041
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of traditional marriage is a legitimate state interest shows that she
would most likely vote to uphold state DOMAs. The fifth vote could
conceivably come from Justice Kennedy, the author of the Court's
opinion in Lawrence. As discussed already, he tried hard to dissociate
the issue of sodomy from the issue of formal recognition of same-sex
relationships. This might be a tip of his hand-that while he believed
that no legitimate interest was served by a state's criminalization of
certain sexual acts, state DOMAs do not suffer from the same impair-
ment. Indeed, some or even all of the other four justices may also sup-
port the traditional notion of marriage since they signed on to
Kennedy's majority opinion. It's hard to tell with certainty which jus-
tices would vote in support of marriage, but it is quite probable that a
majority exists to uphold state DOMA laws.
In 2001, Nebraskans overwhelmingly voted to amend the Constitu-
tion of Nebraska to solidify its definition of marriage as a union be-
tween a man and a woman, and to set forth its public policy of not
extending recognition to same-sex marriages or other unions designed
to be the equivalent of marriage. If the people of Nebraska want to
change this policy, they are free to do so through the democratic
amendment process. This Note has expressed only that the Supreme
Court decision in Lawrence does not provide much support for a con-
stitutional challenge to Nebraska's DOMA.
Kevin R. Corlew
that although the sodomy law "is uncommonly silly," and if he were a member of
the Texas legislature, he would vote against it, as a Supreme Court Justice, he
was not empowered to do so. Id. at 2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As for Chief
Justice Rehnquist, his beliefs against the Court forming public policy might be
summed up in the following quote: "Such an approach.., would also arrogate to
this Court functions of forming public policy, functions which, in the absence of
congressional action, were left by the Framers of the Constitution to state legisla-
tures." Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 691 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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